A party can address only a limited number of issues when in power. What issues to address -the party's agenda -has dynamic implications because it affects what issues will be addressed in the future. We analyze a model in which the incumbent in each period addresses one issue among several issues and the remaining issues roll over to the next period. We identify strategic manipulations in the forms of waiting for the moment, seizing the moment, steering, and preemption depending on how power fluctuates. We discuss efficiency implications of these strategic manipulations.
Introduction
Legislation is not only about what policies to implement, but also about what priorities to set. Time is limited: in the U.S., for example, each congressional term covers a two-year period during which only a small number of issues can be addressed. As such, a party in power must prioritize which issues to address while in office. This raises many questions, for example, which issues are to be prioritized? How does the agenda depend on the strength of political power of the incumbent, the political climate, the characteristics of the issues and the institutional rules?
In this paper we take a first step towards answering these questions by considering a twoperiod model with two parties. In each period one of the parties is in power, which we refer to as the incumbent. The incumbent party in each period has the agenda-setting power -it can choose which issue to legislate among many issues (for example, immigration, healthcare, education, tax reform), but its ability to implement policies on that issue depends on the strength of its power. When it has strong power, it can unilaterally choose the policy; when it has weak power, it needs the consent of the opposition party to implement a policy. The issues that are not addressed are rolled over to the next period, and the incumbent party in the second period chooses an issue to legislate among these remaining issues.
To abstract away from the possibility of strategic manipulations in agenda-setting due to re-election concerns, we deliberately assume that the power transition is exogenous, that is, the identity of the party in power in the second period and the strength of its power do not depend on the decisions made in the first period. Although the power transition is exogenous in our setting, the incumbent's strength of power depends on the political institution under which it operates, and we consider three common institutions -majority rule under which the incumbent has strong power, unanimity rule under which the incumbent has weak power, and supermajority rule under which the incumbent can have either weak or strong power.
We identify issues with their status quos and distinguish between controversial and noncontroversial issues. For a controversial issue, the parties would like to move policy in opposite directions, but for a non-controversial issue, there are policies that both parties prefer to the status quo. Denoting the two parties by D and R, we call a non-controversial issue a Democratic issue when its a status quo is so far away from the ideal of party D that party D regards party R's ideal as an improvement over the status quo. Likewise, we call an issue a Republican issue when its a status quo is so far away from the ideal of party R that party R regards party D's ideal as an improvement over the status quo. The issues differ on how pressing they are: an issue whose status quo yields a lower payoff for a party is more pressing for that party.
We focus on partisan preferences in the sense that the most pressing issue for party D is a Democratic issue and the most pressing issue for party R is a Republican issue, but we assume that parties agree which issue is most pressing among the Democratic issues, and which issue is most pressing among the Republican issues.
When there is no power fluctuation, that is, the incumbent in period one retains the same strength of power in the second period, not surprisingly, its optimal dynamic agenda is the same as its optimal static agenda. When the opposition party is anticipated to come in power in the next period or when the incumbent is expected to gain or lose strength, however, the incumbent in period one may strategically manipulate its agenda. We identify two kinds of manipulation in agenda setting due to dynamic concerns. To illustrate these manipulations, suppose party D is the incumbent in the first period.
The first kind of manipulation is when party D gives priority to a less pressing Democratic issue. This can benefit party D if party R, when it comes in power, addresses the most pressing Democratic issue if it is on the table, but addresses the most pressing Republican issue if the most pressing Democratic issue is no longer on the table. By giving priority to a less pressing Democratic issue and thus leaving the most pressing Democratic issue still on the table, party D directs party R's agenda towards addressing the most pressing Democratic issue. This is what we call the steering effect.
Even when party D is in power in both periods, giving priority to a less pressing Democratic issue can still be beneficial if party D is in strong power early on but anticipates to lose its political strength over time. Specifically, party D may take advantage of its strong political power to address a somewhat less pressing issue and implement its ideal policy, knowing that it will be unable to do so when its power diminishes in the future and the consent of the opposition party is needed. We call this the seize-the-moment effect. Although addressing a less pressing Democratic issue can be dynamically optimal for the incumbent, it is Pareto inefficient since both parties would be better off if the most pressing Democratic issue is addressed first instead.
Many have found the Obama administration's preoccupation with healthcare reform at a time of economic crisis puzzling. Here we offer an explanation in terms of strategic agenda setting by regarding the economic crisis as the a more pressing Democratic issue and healthcare reform as a less pressing Democratic issue. The Obama administration pushed through the healthcare legislation when the Democratic Party controlled both chambers of the Congress.
It is plausible that this was partly due to the realization that they would lose the opportunity of reform with weaker power (seize-the-moment effect). Indeed, some of the news coverage explicitly quoted Obama urging the Democrats to seize the moment, and identified a number of factors including the Democratic control of the White House and Congress among the reasons for why the moment had arisen. 1 Moreover, since the economy is also a pressing issue for the Republicans, the Democrats could still benefit if the Republican party comes in power and addresses the economic issue (the steering effect).
The second kind of manipulation is when party D gives priority to the most pressing Republican issue. This can benefit party D if party R, when it comes in power, addresses the most pressing Republican issue if it is still on the table, but addresses the most pressing Democratic issue when the most pressing Republican issue is no longer on the table. Note that if party R addresses a Democratic issue, it implements its ideal independent of its strength of power and party D benefits since party D views party R's ideal to be an improvement over status quo for a Democratic issue. By contrast, if party R addresses a Republican issue, it either implements its ideal or it implements a policy that party D is just willing to accept. If the most pressing Republican issue has a status quo that is close to party D's ideal, party D does not gain when party R addresses a Republican issue, and therefore it has an incentive to give priority to a Republican issue to prevent party R from addressing it. This is what we call the preemptive effect.
We can interpret the "triangulation" strategy used by the Clinton administration to tackle 1 See, for example, "On Health Care, Obama Tries to Seize the Moment," New York Times, June 18, 2009. crime, a longstanding Republican issue, as an example of preemptive agenda setting. The term is due to the political consultant Dick Morris who was an advisor to Bill Clinton. According to Morris, "the essence of triangulation is to use your party's solutions to solve the other side's problems. Use your tools to fix their car." 2 Indeed, the crime bill addressed a traditionally Republican issue but introduced certain progressive policies, for example, crime prevention programs and a ban on assault weapons. Arguably these had preemptive effects on the Republicans and prevented them from implementing more drastic policies. In our model, such preemptive agenda setting happens only when the incumbent expects to lose power in the future. When the crime issue was tackled, the Democrats controlled both the Congress and the presidency, but during the midterm elections of 1994, the Democrats lost both chambers of the Congress to the Republicans.
Another possible reason for party D to give priority to a Republican issue is that by postponing the most pressing Democratic issue, party D may be able to implement a better policy on that issue later on. This happens when party D is in weak power early on but anticipates to gain in political strength in the future. We call this the wait-for-the-moment effect, a counter-point of seize-the-moment effect.
Related Literature
The power of agenda control has long being recognized in the context of choosing among multiple alternative on a single issue; specifically, the order in which alternatives are pitted against each other affects the voting outcome (see, for example, Black [1958] , McKelvey [1975] , Plott and Levine [1978] , Banks [1985] , Barberà and Gerber [2014] ). In our model, there are multiple issues instead of a single issue on which the players can legislate, and the power of agenda control comes from ordering the sequence of issues rather than ordering the sequence of alternatives. An important aspect of our model is the scarcity of legislative time, 3 and in that sense, it is related to Cǒpič and Katz [2012] . They consider a model of legislative bargaining over distributive policies in which each legislator can make a proposal, but because of limited capacity, only the one chosen by the agenda-setter can be voted on. Unlike our model, 2 See Morris [2003] .
3 As in our model, Duggan and Martinelli [2011] look at the selection of an issue among multiple issues under a capacity constraint, but in the context of media reporting. there is only one issue in their model. A recent literature analyzes bargaining over multiple issues, but the emphasis has mostly been on comparing the case when players bargain over the issues separately and the case when they bundle them together (see, for example, Fershtman [1990] , Inderst [2000] , Lang and Rosenthal [2001] , Chen [2002] , Jackson and Moselle [2002] , In and Serrano [2004] , Chen and Eraslan [2013, 2014] ). Similar to our paper, Anton and Yao [2013] also consider a dynamic setting, but they focus on the effect of delaying an issue on the allocation of influence activity in the future.
Our paper is also related to studies on issue selection in affecting election outcomes. Dellis [2009] shows that politicians may manipulate policies in order to influence the set of issues that is decisive in future elections; and Egorov [2012] and Aragonès, Castanheira, and Giani [2015] study issue selection in political campaigns. Our paper complements these studies since they consider what issues candidates choose to focus on in order to get elected whereas we analyze what issues parties choose to address to affect future agenda.
Agenda setting is also an important area of research in communication theory, but the focus is on the ability of news media to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda (an early study is McCombs and Shaw [1972] ). As can been seen, "agenda setting" has different meanings in different contexts. Since we use the phrase to refer to setting priorities in policymaking, our paper shares the same interest with the seminal book by Kingdon [1984] , which is a descriptive study drawn from interviews, case studies, government documents, party platforms, press coverage, and public opinion surveys, but does not provide formal analysis. We describe our model in section 2 and then provide examples in section 3 to illustrate the strategic manipulations that can arise due to dynamic concerns. We discuss two benchmarks, Pareto efficient outcomes and dictatorship outcomes, in section 4. We divide our analysis of the dynamic agenda-setting game into the period-2 problem (section 5) and the period-1 problem (section 6) and provide some discussion on extensions of our model in section 7.
The model
There are two parties D and R. In each of two periods t = 1, 2, one of the parties is in power, and we refer to this party as the incumbent. The incumbent in a given period has the agenda-setting right to choose a one-dimensional issue among many issues to legislate. In each period, the incumbent can choose to legislate on only one issue. In period 1, any issue can be legislated, and in period 2, any issue other than the one legislated in period 1 can be legislated. 4
The status quo of an issue is in R. We assume that party D's ideal policy on each issue is D ∈ R and party R's ideal policy on each issue is R ∈ R with R > D. At the beginning of period 1, there are n R issues with status quos to the left of D, n C issues with status quos between D and R and n D issues with status quos to the right of R. The total number of issues is N = n R + n C + n D and we assume that N ≥ 2. From now on, we identify an issue in a given period with its status quo for ease of exposition. 5
The stage utility for party i ∈ {D, R} from the policies implemented at time t is additively separable across issues and each party has the same payoff function on each issue. 6 Let z kt denote the policy implemented for issue k at time t, and let z t = (z 1t , . . . , z N t ). Stage utility of party i at time t is given by
The dynamic utility for party i is the sum of the stage utilities u i (z 1 ) + u i (z 2 ). 7 Suppose in period 1, an issue with status quo s 1 is addressed and the policy implemented is x, and in period 2, an issue with status quo s 2 is addressed and the policy implemented is y.
Then the gain in payoff in period 1 for party i is v i (x) − v i (s 1 ) and the gain in payoff in period
. Therefore the total gain in payoff for party i is
. Notice that once a policy is implemented on an issue, then it 4 We assume that once an issue is addressed, it cannot be addressed again. Without this assumption, we need to consider the implications of endogenous status quo, which complicates the analysis. Glazer and Lohmann [1999] quote Bill Clinton as saying "After I sign my name to this bill, welfare will no longer be a political issue. . . . The two parties cannot attack each other over it" right before signing the welfare bill to "end welfare as we know it." Although in practice it is possible that an issue addressed previously is brought to the negotiation table again, in general it seems costly to revisit an issue that has already been addressed in the recent past. We discuss what happens when the parties are allowed to revisit an issue that has been addressed in section 7. 5 We avoid identifying an issue with its status quo across periods, because once an issue is addressed, its status quo changes.
6 These assumptions allow us to reduce this multi-dimensional problem to a single dimensional problem and highlight the basic ideas in a simple model. Similar manipulations in agenda setting as those identified in our paper would arise in a multi-dimensional setting in which the parties' ideals and their payoff functions are different across different dimensions, but the analysis would be significantly more complicated. 7 We assume that there is no discounting to avoid more notation. If discounting is introduced, our main results would hold with the discount factor sufficiently high.
is persistent, and the parties continue to care about the issues that they addressed in the past. This is why when an issue is addressed in period 1, the parties gain in both that period and the next period.
We assume v i is continuous and single-peaked at i. We refer to an issue to the left of D as a Republican issue and an issue to the right of R as a Democratic issue. We say that issues between D and R are controversial, and issues outside the [D, R] interval are non-controversial.
For the non-controversial issues, we use a lower index to indicate a more extreme status quo.
That is, we enumerate the issues in period 1 so that
Note that since v i is single-peaked, a Democratic issue has a status quo so bad for party D that it prefers party R's ideal to the status quo, and a Republican issue has a status quo so bad for party R that it prefers party D's ideal to the status quo. Moreover, we assume the preferences satisfy a single-crossing property. Specifically, for any x and x such that x > x,
satisfies these conditions. We say that issue s is more pressing for party i than issue s if v i (s) < v i (s ). We say that the preferences are partisan if the most pressing issue for party D is a Democratic issue and the most pressing issue for party
. For most of our analysis, we assume that the preferences are partisan. 8 For a given issue being legislated, how a policy is chosen depends on the political strength of the incumbent party. If the incumbent party is strong, then it unilaterally chooses the policy to implement. If it is weak, then it needs the approval of the out-of-power party for implementation of the policy it proposes. In this case, we assume that the incumbent party makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If the out-of-power party accepts, the proposal is implemented; otherwise the status quo prevails. Since there are two parties, there are four possible power states denoted by S D , S R , W D , and W R . In period t, political power is described by the the realization of a random variable π t ∈ {S D , S R , W D , W R }. If π t = S i , party i is in strong power in period t; if π t = W i , party i is in weak power in period t. For expositional simplicity, we assume that π 1 is degenerate, that is Pr(π 1 = x) = 1 for some x ∈ {S D , S R , W D , W R }. 9 We assume that the distribution of π t is exogenously given, but what power states can occur with positive probability depends on the institution. 10 Loosely, we can think of the incumbent party as the party with the larger number of seats in the legislature. Under majority rule, the incumbent is strong, and thus π t = W D , W R for t ∈ {1, 2}. Under unanimity rule, the incumbent is weak, and thus π t = S D , S R for t ∈ {1, 2}. Under supermajority rule, the incumbent can be either strong or weak. Specifically, if the fraction of the seats held by the incumbent exceeds the supermajority threshold, then the incumbent is strong; if it is below the supermajority threshold, then it is weak.
If a party is in power, then it decides (i) what issue to address; and (ii) what policy to propose (in a weak power state) or to implement (in a strong power state) on that issue. If a party is out of power, then it decides whether to accept or reject the proposal (in a weak power state). Since the issue not addressed in the first period rolls over to the second period, there is a dynamic link between the decisions made in the first period and the feasible actions in the second period. As such, the parties take into account the dynamic implications of their decisions in the first period. The solution concept we use is subgame perfect equilibrium and we solve the game using backward induction.
Examples
In this section, we use simple examples to illustrate the potential manipulations in agendasetting due to dynamic concerns. For all the examples, we assume that D = −1 and R = 1.
Example 1. Party D addresses a less pressing Democratic issue under unanimity rule.
Suppose there are two Democratic issues and two Republican issues with R 1 = −1.4, R 2 = −1.25, D 2 = 1.75, D 1 = 1.9, and v i (x) = −|x − i|. These issues together with the parties' 9 This assumption has no consequence for the analysis since we consider different initial power state. We can think of this as indexing the equilibrium by the realization of the initial state, as in Dixit, Grossman, and Gül [2000] .
10 Many political economy models assume that the transition probability is independent of the incumbent's policy choice. See, for example, Persson and Svensson [1989] , Tabellini and Alesina [1990] , Acemoḡlu, Golosov, and Tysvinski [2011] and Callander and Hummel [2014] .
preferences are illustrated in Figure 1 . 11 Party D is in weak power in period 1 and party R will come in weak power in period 2. Given that party D needs the consent of party R to change policy in period 1, if it addresses issue D 1 , then it can move the policy on D 1 to 0.1 by making party R just willing to accept.
Likewise, if it addresses issue D 2 , then it can move the policy on issue D 2 to 0.25 by making party R just willing to accept. Since party D can obtain a better compromise by addressing issue D 1 , it is in the short-term interest for party D to address the most pressing Democratic issue D 1 instead of addressing the less pressing Democratic issue D 2 . But as we show below, with dynamic considerations, party D finds it optimal to roll over the most pressing issue to period 2 to induce party R to address D 1 in period 2.
To see this, note that if party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then party R addresses issue R 1 in period 2. This is because party R can move the policy on R 1 towards its ideal by 0.8 (from −1.4 to −0.6) and can move the policy on issue D 2 towards its ideal by 0.75 (from 1.75 to 1). Given the utility function v R (x) = −|x − R|, party R cares about only the distance by which it can move a policy towards its ideal. As a result, party R gains more by addressing R 1 than by addressing D 2 .
By contrast, if party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, then party R addresses issue D 1 in period 2 since it can move the policy on D 1 towards its ideal by 0.9 (from 1.9 to 1) whereas it can move policy on R 1 by only 0.8 (from −1.4 to −0.6). Although issue R 1 is the most pressing issue for party R, its ability to move the policy on that issue is limited given its weak power whereas it can still implement its ideal policy on issue D 1 . Consequently, when issue D 1 is still on the table, party R finds it optimal to address it even though it is less pressing than issue
Given that party D does not gain when party R addresses issue R 1 (which happens when party D addresses issue D 1 in the first period) but gains somewhat when party R addresses issue D 1 (which happens when party D addresses issue D 2 in the first period), addressing issue D 1 instead of addressing issue D 2 in period 1 involves long term costs. It is straightforward to verify that these long term costs overweigh the short term benefits, 12 and as a result, party D is better off addressing issue D 2 in period 1 instead of addressing D 1 .
It is also straightforward to verify that it is not optimal for party D to address a Republican issue in period 1. Specifically, addressing R 1 or R 2 is dominated by addressing D 2 in period 1 since in either case, party R will address D 1 in period 2 and the short-term gain from addressing D 2 is higher for party D.
As this example illustrates, a party's dynamic concerns can lead to manipulations in agenda setting in the sense that its optimal dynamic agenda is different from its optimal static agenda.
Here, dynamic concerns drive party D to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue.
Intuitively, this is dynamically optimal because party D can steer party R's agenda towards addressing the most pressing Democratic issue in period 2 when party R comes in power. The equilibrium is inefficient since both parties would have been better off if the most pressing Democratic issue is addressed first.
Example 2. Party D addresses a less pressing Democratic issue under supermajority rule.
The issues and party D's preferences are as in Example 1. Party R's preferences are given
The issues together with the parties'
12 By addressing D 1 in period 1, the total gain for party D across the two periods is 1.8 × 2 = 3.6. If party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, it can move the policy towards its ideal by 1.5 on that issue (from 1.75 to 0.25). In period 2, party R will address issue D 1 by moving the policy on that issue from 1.9 to its own ideal 1. Hence, the total gain in payoff for party D across the two periods is 1.5 × 2 + 0.9 = 3.9, which is higher than 3.6, the total gain for party D if it addresses issue D 1 in period 1.
preferences are illustrated in Figure 2 . Party D is strong power in period 1 and it will be in weak power in period 2.
As in Example 1, it is in the short-term interest for party D to address issue D 1 in period 1 but its optimal dynamic agenda gives priority to D 2 in period 1. To understand the dynamic incentive in this case, first note that if issue D 1 is rolled over to period 2, then party D addresses issue D 1 in period 2, but it addresses issue D 2 in period 2 if D 1 is already addressed in period 1. 13 Turning to period 1, regardless of which issue party D addresses in period 1, it will move the policy on that issue to its ideal since it is in strong power in period 1. It is advantageous for party D to roll over the more pressing issue D 1 because it can extract a better compromise on issue D 1 than on issue D 2 if it is in weak power in period 2. By addressing the less pressing issue D 2 when in strong power, party D is able to implement its ideal policy on D 2 as well as getting a better compromise on issue D 1 when its power weakens in the future. Consequently, party D finds it optimal to address D 2 in period 1 to take advantage of its strong power. 14 We 13 Since party D is in weak power in period 1, it can move the policy on issue D 1 towards its ideal by 2.7 (from 1.9 to −0.8), on issue D 2 by 2.25 (from 1.75 to −0.5), on R 1 by 0.4 (from −1.4 to −1) and on R 2 by 0.25 (from −1.25 to −1).
14 If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then it can move the policy towards its ideal by 2.9 on that issue (from 1.9 to −1). In this case, it addresses issue D 2 in period 2 by moving the policy on D 2 from 1.75 to −0.5. Hence, the total gain for party D across the two periods is 2 × 2.9 + 2.25 = 8.05. If party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, then it can move the policy on that issue towards its ideal by 2.75 on that issue (from −1.75 to −1). In this case, it addresses issue D 1 in period 2 by moving the policy on that issue by 2.7 (from 1.9 to ideal −0.8). Hence, the total gain in payoff for party D across the two periods is 2.75 × 2 + 2.7 = 8.2, which is higher than the total gain for party D if it addresses issue D 1 in period 1.
can think of this as a "seize-the-moment" effect. As in Example 1, the outcome is inefficient.
Example 3. Party D addresses a Republican issue under unanimity rule.
Suppose there are two Democratic issues and two Republican issues with R 1 = −1.975,
These issues together with the parties' preferences are illustrated in Figure 3 . Party D is in weak power in period 1 and party R will come in weak power in period 2. It is in the short-term interest for party D to address issue D 1 since it can move the policy on issue D 1 towards its ideal by 1 (from 1.5 to 0.5) whereas it can move the policy on issue R 1 towards its ideal by only 0.975 (from −1.975 to −1), but we show below that the optimal agenda for party D is to give priority to the Republican issue R 1 .
To see this, note that if issue R 1 is rolled over to period 1, then party R finds it optimal to address R 1 in period 2, but if issue R 1 is addressed in period 1, then party R finds it optimal to address D 1 in period 2. 15 Since party R addresses issue R 1 regardless of what other issue was addressed in period 1 and party D's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing issue D 1 instead of D 2 or R 2 , it follows that addressing issue D 1 is strictly better than addressing issue D 2 or R 2 in period 1 for party D. So we only need to compare the choice between issue D 1 and issue R 1 .
15 Under unanimity, party R can move the policy on R 1 towards its ideal by 1.95 (from −1.975 to −0.025), on R 2 by 0.4 (from −1.2 to −0.8), on D 1 by 0.5 (from 1.5 to 1), and on D 2 by 0.4 (from 1.4 to 1).
Given that party D does not gain when party R addresses issue R 1 (which happens when party D addresses issue D 1 in the first period) but gains somewhat when party R addresses issue D 1 (which happens when party D addresses issue R 1 in the first period), addressing issue D 1 instead of addressing issue R 1 in period 1 involves long term costs. It is straightforward to verify that these long term costs overweigh the short term benefits, 16 and as a result, party D is better off addressing issue R 1 in period 1 instead of addressing D 1 .
In this example, party D's dynamic incentive drives it to go against its short-term interest and give priority to a Republican issue. Intuitively, party D preempts party R by giving priority to issue R 1 since party D does not benefit if party R addresses issue R 1 but benefits to some degree if party R addresses D 1 . Unlike in the previous example the equilibrium outcome is still efficient since there is no Pareto improvement.
Example 4. Party D addresses a Republican issue under supermajority rule.
The issues and the parties' preferences are the same as in Example 3, but now party D is in weak power in period 1 and expects to have strong power in period 2.
As in Example 3, it is in the short-term interest for party D to address issue D 1 in period 1 but its optimal dynamic agenda gives priority to R 1 in period 1. To understand the dynamic incentives in this case, first note that regardless of which issue party D addresses in period 2, it will move the policy on that issue to D since it is in strong power in period 2. As such, if issue D 1 is rolled over the second period, then party D addresses issue D 1 , and it addresses issue D 2 in period 2 if D 1 was already addressed in period 1. Turning to period 1, the ability of party D to move the policy on Democratic issues towards its ideal is constrained by the acceptance condition of party R. By contrast, party D can still implement its ideal on a Republican issue even when in weak power. Consequently, party D finds it optimal to address R 1 in period 1 and postpone addressing D 1 to period 2 to take advantage of its strong power in period 2. 17 We can think of this as "wait-for-the-moment" effect.
Benchmarks
Dynamically Pareto efficient outcomes
The first benchmark we consider is dynamically Pareto efficient outcomes. These are the outcomes that are Pareto efficient subject to the constraint that the policy on only one issue can be changed in each period. We impose this constraint since parties in the game we consider can change policy on only one issue in each period, so we can think of this as a technological constraint. In the social planner's problem, there are four choice variables: the issue s 1 addressed in period 1; the policy implemented on the issue addressed in period 1, denoted by
x; the issue s 2 addressed in period 2; and the policy implemented on the issue addressed in period 2, denoted by y. Let S denote set of the issues at the beginning of period 1, that is,
Formally, a dynamically Pareto efficient outcome solves the following social planner's problem:
We use the following result to discuss efficiency properties of equilibria. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. In any dynamically Pareto efficient outcome, if s is more pressing than s for both parties and issue s is addressed, then issue s is addressed in period 1.
17 If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then it can move the policy towards its ideal by 1 on that issue (from 1.5 to 0.5). In this case, it addresses issue D 2 in period 2 by moving the policy on D 2 from 1.4 to its ideal −1. Hence, the total gain for party D across the two periods is 2 × 1 + 2.4 = 4.4. If party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1, then it can move the policy towards its ideal by 0.975 on that issue (from −1.975 to −1). In this case, it addresses issue D 1 in period 2 by moving the policy on that issue from 1.5 to its ideal −1. Hence, the total gain in payoff for party D across the two periods is 0.975 × 2 + 2.5 = 4.45, which is higher than the total gain for party D if it addresses issue D 1 in period 1.
Dictatorship
We next consider dictatorship. Specifically, suppose party i is the dictator in both periods and it can address one issue in each period. In this case, party i does not face any dynamic trade-off, and therefore its optimal dynamic agenda is the same as its optimal static agenda.
Thus, in each period, between issues s and s , party i is better off by addressing issue s and implementing its ideal policy on that issue if v i (s) < v i (s ). This implies that the dictator party chooses to address the most pressing issue for itself in each period.
No power fluctuation
Dictatorship is a special case in which there is no power fluctuation. In the next proposition, we show that more generally, in the absence of power fluctuation, the optimal dynamic agenda coincides with the optimal static agenda. 18 Proposition 2. If there is no power fluctuation, that is, if π 2 = π 1 with probability 1, then the incumbent addresses issue k in period 1 only if its period-1 payoff is maximized by addressing issue k.
The incumbent is in strong power under majority rule and in weak power under unanimity rule. Under either rule, if the incumbent continues to be in power in period 2, then the power state is the same across periods and Proposition 2 implies there is no strategic manipulation in the incumbent's agenda. Under supermajority rule, however, the incumbent can be in either strong or weak power, and even if it continues to be in power in period 2, the power state may still change, so Proposition 2 no longer applies. Indeed, as illustrated in Examples 2 and 4, under supermajority rule, the optimal dynamic agenda may be different from the optimal static agenda even if the incumbent remains the same. In the next section, we analyze what strategic manipulations in agenda setting may arise from dynamic concerns in the presence of power fluctuations in general.
18 All the remaining results describe equilibrium properties.
Period-2 problem
To facilitate the analysis, we define two functions d and r as follows. For x ≤ D, let
Intuitively, d(x) is the optimal proposal that party R makes on an issue with status quo x to the left of D under unanimity, and r(x) is the optimal proposal that party D makes on an issue with status quo x to the right of R under unanimity. The figures below illustrate these two functions. The next proposition characterizes the optimal agenda in period 2. For expositional simplicity, we assume that when the incumbent is indifferent between addressing a Republican issue and addressing a Democratic issue, it chooses the agenda that makes the other party better off.
Proposition 3.
1. If the incumbent has strong power in period 2, then it addresses the most pressing issue for itself.
2. Suppose the incumbent has weak power in period 2 and not all issues are controversial. 
and if party R is the incumbent, then it addresses issue s D if and only if
(b) If the non-controversial issues are all Democratic issues or all Republican issues, then the incumbent addresses the most pressing issue for itself.
Proposition 3 implies that the incumbent in period 2 addresses the most pressing issue for one of the parties.
Period-1 problem
We first show that if the set of issues is rich enough, and in particular, if there are at least two Democratic issues and two Republican issues, then the incumbent in period 1 does not address issues whose status quos are not extreme. Formally, we have the following result.
Lemma 1. Suppose there are at least two Democratic issues and two Republican issues in period 1. Then the incumbent in period 1 does not address R i or D i with i ≥ 3, or any controversial issue.
To prove Lemma 1, we show that addressing issue R 2 dominates addressing issue R i with i ≥ 3 for the incumbent in period 1. This is because addressing issue R 2 gives the incumbent a strictly higher payoff in period 1 and by Proposition 3, the choice of the incumbent in period 2 is the same regardless of whether issue R 2 or R i was addressed in period 1. A similar argument shows that addressing issue D 2 dominates addressing issue D i with i ≥ 3 and addressing any controversial issue is dominated by addressing either D 2 or R 2 in period 1.
Lemma 1 implies that if there are at least two Democratic issues and two Republican issues in period 1, then it is without loss of generality to consider the agenda-setting problem when there are two Democratic issues and two Republican issues. For the remainder of this section, this is the case that we analyze. For expositional simplicity, we assume that party D is the incumbent in period 1. Symmetric results hold when party R is the incumbent.
Since controversial issues are not addressed in either period when there are at least two Democratic issues and two Republican issues at the beginning of the game by Lemma 1, the payoffs from the controversial issues do not affect the parties' choice. As such, when we discuss the parties' payoffs in the remainder of this section, we omit the payoffs from controversial issues. 19 We next establish that no matter what the voting rule is, party D does not give priority to a less pressing Republican issue.
Proposition 4. Regardless of the voting rule, party D does not address R 2 in period 1, that is, party D does not give priority to a less pressing Republican issue.
We prove Proposition 4 by showing that addressing the more pressing issue R 1 instead of issue R 2 in period 1 gives party D a higher dynamic payoff. First, note that regardless of its strength of power in period 1, if party D addresses a Republican issue, it moves the policy on that issue to its ideal. Hence, party D's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing issue R 1 than by addressing issue R 2 . Moreover, similar to the argument for Proposition 2 (which concerns the case when there is no power fluctuation), if party D continues to be in power in period 2, its period-2 payoff is also higher if issue R 1 instead of issue R 2 was addressed in period 1. The interesting case is when party R comes in power in period 2 and its choice of agenda varies with what issue has been addressed by party D. If party R is in strong power, this arises if issue R 1 is more pressing than issue D 1 and issue D 1 is in turn more pressing than issue R 2 for party R. In this case, by the single-crossing property, party D also finds issue D 1 more pressing than issue R 2 . Hence, party D is better off if issue R 2 remains at its status quo (which happens if party R addresses issue D 1 in period 2) than if issue D 1 remains at its status quo (which happens if party R addresses issue R 1 in period 2). It follows that party D is better off in period 2 by addressing issue R 1 first to induce its rival to address issue D 1 subsequently than by addressing R 2 first to induce its rival to address R 1 subsequently. This implies that if party R is expected to come in strong power in period 2, party D receives a higher dynamic payoff by addressing the more pressing issue R 1 than R 2 in period 1. A similar, albeit more 19 When the set of issues is sparse, then it is possible that controversial issues are addressed in equilibrium as illustrated by the following example. Suppose the voting rule is supermajority, and party D is in strong power in period 1 and is expected to be in weak power in period 2. Suppose also that there are two issues R 1 and C 1 in period 1 with R 1 < D < C 1 < R. If v D (R 1 ) < v D (C 1 ), then it is in the short-term interest for party D to give priority to issue R 1 . However, the optimal dynamic agenda for party D may be to give priority to issue C 1 . Intuitively, since issue C 1 is controversial, party D addresses it when it has the political power to change the policy on issue C 1 and postpones tackling issue R 1 . Because the parties have common ground on issue R 1 , it enables party D to implement its ideal even when in weak power.
involved, argument shows that if party R is expected to come in weak power in period 2, party D also receives a higher dynamic payoff by addressing the more pressing issue R 1 than R 2 in period 1.
Proposition 4 says that even with dynamic concerns, party D does not give priority to a less pressing Republican issue independent of the voting rule. But does party D ever give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue? As we show in the following subsections, the answer depends on the voting rule and the degree of polarization between the two parties. Before we turn to different voting rules, we provide the following lemma, which gives a useful necessary condition for party D to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue under either majority or unanimity rule.
Lemma 2. Under either majority rule or unanimity rule, if party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, then it must be the case that if R come in power in period 2, then it addresses issue D 1 if D 2 was addressed in period 1 and it addresses issue R 1 if D 1 was addressed in period 1.
Under majority rule and unanimity rule, power fluctuates only when the opposition party comes in power in period 2. As such, by Proposition 2, for party D to give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue in period 1 under either rule, the probability that party R comes in power in period 2 must be positive. Lemma 2 says that it also must be the case that party D's agenda in period 1 affects the agenda of party R should it come in power in period 2. In particular, if the most pressing Democratic issue has been addressed, then party R addresses the most pressing Republican issue, but if the most pressing Democratic issue is still on the table, then party R addresses it.
Majority rule
Consider majority rule first. Under majority rule, the incumbent in either period has strong power and can implements its ideal policy on the issue of its choice. Party D's period-1 payoff is clearly higher if it addresses issue D 1 than if it addresses issue D 2 . If party D continues to be in power in period 2, then, as shown in Proposition 2, party D is better off by addressing D 1 than D 2 in period 1. Furthermore, since R 1 is the most pressing issue for party R, if party R comes in power in period 2, it would address R 1 regardless of whether D 1 or D 2 was addressed in period 1. It follows that, there is no gain in its period-2 payoff if party D gives priority to issue D 2 and therefore it does not give priority to D 2 in period 1. In the next proposition, we show that party D does not benefit from giving priority to a Republican issue either, implying that it addresses the most pressing Democratic issue D 1 in period 1. So under majority rule, the incumbent's optimal dynamic agenda coincides with its optimal static agenda.
Proposition 5. Under majority rule, party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1.
We give some intuition for why party D does not give priority to a Republican issue under majority rule. Note that if party D addresses D 1 in period 1, then party R would address issue R 1 in period 2. In this case, by the end of period 2, one issue is moved to D's ideal, another issue is moved to R's ideal, and issues D 2 and R 2 remain unaddressed. If party D addresses R 1 in period 1, then party R would address either issue D 1 or issue R 2 in period 2. Consider first the case when party R addresses issue D 1 in period 2. In this case too, by the end of period 2, one issue is moved to D's ideal, another issue is moved to R's ideal, and issues D 2 and R 2 remain unaddressed, implying that party D's period-2 payoff is the same regardless of whether it addresses issue D 1 or R 1 in period 1. Since party D's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing D 1 than addressing R 1 in period 1, party D should give priority to issue D 1 . Lastly, consider the case when party R addresses issue R 2 in period 2. Note that party D is worse off if party R addresses issue R 2 than if party R addresses issue D 1 . Therefore, by transitivity, party D does not give priority to issue R 1 in this case as well. 20
Unanimity rule
In contrast to majority rule, under unanimity rule, dynamic concerns may drive party D to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue. To understand the difference, recall that by Lemma 2, if party D addresses D 2 in period 1, it must be the case that if party R comes in 20 When preferences are nonpartisan, it is possible that party D gives priority to a less pressing Democratic
, and it is sufficiently likely that party R comes in power in period 2, then party D addresses D 2 in period 1. Another interesting case is when the parties have nonpartisan preferences and the most pressing issue has a sufficiently bad status quo for both parties. We can think of this as crisis. For example, if D 1 is the most pressing issue with a sufficiently bad status quo for both parties, then party D addresses D 1 even under non-partisan preferences. Not surprisingly, there is no manipulation in agenda setting when the parties face a crisis. power in period 2, party R would address D 1 if it is still on the table but would address R 1 if D 1 is no longer on the table. A necessary condition for this is that between issues D 1 and R 1 , party R prefers to address issue D 1 . Since the most pressing issue for party R is R 1 , this clearly cannot be satisfied under majority rule, but it can still be satisfied under unanimity rule. This is because under unanimity, the policies that party R can implement on a Republican issue is constrained by the approval of party D, but party R can implement its ideal on a Democratic issue, which makes it more attractive for party R to address a Democratic issue under unanimity.
Hence, under unanimity, party D may affect party R's agenda in period 2 by giving priority to issue D 2 and thus leaving D 1 still on the table. This manipulation is beneficial to party D if the gain in its period-2 payoff more than compensates the loss in its period-1 payoff. We call this the steering effect since the reason for party D to give priority to the less pressing issue D 2 is that it can then steer party R's agenda towards addressing D 1 . By Proposition 1, steering is inefficient since both parties would benefit if issue D 1 , which is more pressing for both parties, is addressed in period 1 instead.
If the preferences are strongly partisan, that is
, 21 then party R prefers to address issue R 1 between issues R 1 and D 1 even under unanimity rule, and this implies that party D would not give priority to issue D 2 in period 1. One may conjecture that under unanimity rule, if preferences are strongly partisan, then party D always addresses issue D 1 in period 1, an analog of Proposition 5. But as the next proposition shows, unlike what happens under majority rule, party D may still go against its short-term interest and address issue R 1 instead of D 1 in period 1 under unanimity rule.
Proposition 6. Under unanimity rule, (i) party D may address D 2 in period 1, that is, party D may give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue, but if the preferences are strongly partisan, party D does not give priority to issue D 2 ; (ii) even if the preferences are strongly partisan, party D may still give priority to the Republican issue R 1 in period 1.
We have already discussed the steering effect that drives party D to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue; as to party D's giving priority to a Republican issue, we can think of it as preemptive agenda setting. If party D does not address the most pressing Republican issue when in power, then the opposition party will surely address it if it comes in power in the next period. Since party D typically does not benefit when party R addresses a Republican issue but benefits to some degree if party R addresses a Democratic issue, party D may have the incentive to preemptively tackle the most pressing Republican issue and induce the opposition party to address the most pressing Democratic issue when it comes in power. For preemption to be successful, party R should prefer to address D 1 between issues D 1 and R 2 , which is still possible under strongly partisan preferences, provided that the status quo of issue R 2 is not too far from party R's ideal. Under strongly partisan preferences, party D's optimal static agenda is to address D 1 even under unanimity rule, and therefore giving priority to R 1 goes against its short-term interest. But unlike the steering effect which is necessarily inefficient, preemption can still be efficient since R 1 is the most pressing issue for party R. 22
Supermajority rule
Under supermajority, the possibilities of power transition become richer. In particular, power fluctuations may now involve the same party holding on to majority, but the strength of its power changing over time. This gives rise to new dynamic effects in agenda setting, as we show below.
The first result we present under supermajority rule shows that the conditions we established for party D to give priority to a less pressing Democratic issue under unanimity rule and to have it ruled out under majority rule can be extended in the following sense: if the party in power in period 2 is likely to be strong, then party D does not give priority to issue D 2 (an extension of Proposition 5), but if the party in power in period 2 is likely to be weak, then party D may give priority to issue D 2 (an extension of Proposition 6, part (i)).
Proposition 7. Under supermajority rule, (i) if it is sufficiently likely that the party in power in period 2 is strong, then party D does not give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue D 2 in period 1, (ii) if it is sufficiently likely that the party in power in period 2 is weak, then party D may give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue D 2 in period 1.
For part (ii), party D may have the incentive to give priority to the less pressing issue D 2 due to two effects. First, if party D expects to lose power to party R, then it may want to roll over the more pressing issue D 1 to induce R to tackle it in period 2. This is similar to the steering effect identified under unanimity rule. Second, if party D expects to be still in power, but only weakly, then it may want to roll over the more pressing issue D 1 to extract a better compromise. This is reminiscent of Romer and Rosenthal [1979] , which shows that a monopoly agenda-setter is better off when the status quo is further away from the opponent's ideal. Our result extends Romer and Rosenthal [1979] by providing an implication of their insight in a dynamic multiple-issue setting. Note that unlike the steering effect, the second effect arises only under supermajority rule in which the same party is still in power in period 2 but with weakened political strength -this is the "seize-the-moment" effect discussed in Example 2.
Another new effect may arise under supermajority rule when the incumbent is in weak power in period 1 but expects to gain in political strength in the future. As we show in Proposition 8, party D may give priority to a Republican issue against its short-term interest in this case (under strongly partisan preferences, party D's optimal static agenda is to address issue D 1 ). The reason here for party D to give priority to a Republican issue is different from the preemptive effect under unanimity rule. Party D benefits from giving priority to a Republican issue here because by postponing the most pressing issue D 1 until it gains enough political strength, it will be able to implement its ideal policy on that issue. This is the "waitfor-the-moment" effect discussed in Example 4.
Proposition 8. Under supermajority rule, even if the preferences are strongly partisan, party D may give priority to the Republican issue R 1 in period 1 if it is in weak power in period 1 but expects to be in strong power in period 2.
Discussion and concluding remarks
Understanding agenda setting in a multi-issue setting with limited capacity is an important research question, but it has received limited attention in the literature. Our analysis has shown the different strategic manipulations that may arise under different power transitions when the agenda formed in an earlier period has dynamic implications. Even though our model is stylized, we view a main contribution of our paper as providing a simple but plausible framework that one can build upon to address further questions about agenda setting. Indeed, there are many interesting directions in which to extend the model, and we discuss some of them here.
Revisiting an issue. One assumption we have made is that once an issue is addressed, it cannot be addressed again in the next period. In the following example, we illustrate that if an issue addressed earlier is allowed to be revisited, then it creates an endogenous status quo. In this case, in addition to strategic manipulations in agenda setting, an incumbent may implement a policy that is not statically optimal on the issue of its choice.
First consider the case in which there are only two Democratic issues with D 1 = 2.5, D 2 = 2, party D is in strong power in period 1 and party R is in strong power in period 2. If an issue that has been addressed in period 1 cannot be revisited in period 2, then in equilibrium, party D addresses issue D 1 by moving the policy on that issue to its ideal D in period 1 and party R addresses the remaining issue D 2 in period 2 by moving the policy on that issue to its ideal R.
If an issue that has been addressed in period 1 is allowed to be revisited in period 2, however, it is no longer optimal for party D to address D 1 in period 1. To see this, suppose party D addresses D 1 in period 1. Note that if it moves the policy on that issue D 1 to its ideal D, then, in period 2, party R will revisit the issue and move the policy to its ideal R. In this case, the total gain in payoff for party D is 3.5 + 1.5 = 5. If party D addresses issue D 1 by moving the policy on that issue to 0 instead, then, in period 2, party R will address issue D 2 by moving the policy on that issue to its ideal R. 23 In this case, party D's total gain in payoff 23 We assume that party R addresses issue D 2 with the status quo at 2 even though it is indifferent between is 2.5 × 2 + 1 = 6. Hence, if party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, it is optimal to move the policy on that issue to 0 instead of all the way to its ideal D to prevent party R from revisiting the issue in period 2. Similarly, if party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, it is optimal to move the policy on that issue to −0.5 instead of all the way to its ideal so that party R does not revisit the issue in period 2. In this case, party R addresses issue D 1 in period 2 by moving the policy to its ideal R = 1. Hence, the total gain in payoff to party D is 2.5 × 2 + 1.5 = 6.5, which implies that it is better for party D to address issue D 2 . This example shows that when an issue can be revisited, not only does party D give priority to the less pressing issue D 2 , it also implements a policy on that issue which is not statically optimal. In particular, the policy it implements is more moderate than if the issue cannot be revisited. 24 In the preceding example, the set of issues is sparse. Indeed, if there are Republican issues as well as Democratic issues, then party R would address a Republican issue in period 2.
Anticipating this, party D would address D 1 in period 1 by moving it to its ideal. But when the set of issues is rich enough, does the incumbent always move the policy on the issue of its choice to the static optimum given its strength of power? The next example shows that the answer is no.
Suppose that there are two Republican issues with R 1 = −1.2 and R 2 = −1 in addition to the two Democratic issues with D 1 = 2.5, D 2 = 2. Consider unanimity rule. Assume that party D is in weak power in period 1 and party R is in weak power in period 2. Suppose party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1. Note that if D proposes to move the policy to r(D 1 ) = −0.5, party R will reject the proposal even though v R (D 1 ) = v R (r(D 1 )). This is because if party R accepts the proposal, then, when it comes in power in period 2, it would address issue D 2 by moving the policy to its ideal R, resulting in a total gain in payoff equal to 1 for party R since it gains 0 in payoff in period 1. However, if party R rejects the proposal in period 1, then, when it comes in power in period 2, it would address issue D 1 by moving the policy to its ideal R, resulting in a total gain in payoff equal to 2 for party R. Because of its dynamic concerns, addressing D 2 and issue D 1 whose status quo is at 0 in period 2. Without this assumption, party D does not have a best response in period 1. 24 The moderation effect on policy through endogenous status quo is reminiscent of Bowen, Chen, and Eraslan [2014] . A similar effect also appears in Buisseret and Bernhardt [2015] . party R accepts a proposal x on issue D 1 only if x ≥ 0. In equilibrium, party D addresses issue D 1 by moving the policy on that issue to 0 in period 1 and party R addresses issue D 2 by moving the policy on that issue to its ideal R in period 2. In this example, although party D addresses the most pressing issue in period 1, it does not move it to the static optimum to prevent it from being rejected by the opposition party.
Endogenous number of issues addressed. We have considered the stark case in which only one issue can be addressed in a period. Although this approach has provided useful insight into parties' dynamic incentives in setting their agendas, one should think that the number of major issues that are tackled in a political cycle is not fixed. Understanding what determines the scope of a party's agenda, in particular, when a party is able to push an expansive agenda and when it is stuck in gridlock is an interesting and important question.
Non-stationary preferences. In our model, we assume that preferences do not change over time, which rules out the possibility that an issue that is not the most pressing today can become the most pressing issue in the future if no new policy is implemented (for example, climate change). New questions arise in the presence of non-stationary preferences -for example, does a party give priority to an issue that is not especially pressing today to prevent it from becoming serious in the future or does it delay addressing the issue to make it urgent for the opposition party to tackle? We leave these interesting questions for future research.
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose (s * 1 , s * 2 , x * , y * ) is a dynamically efficient outcome, where s * t is the issue addressed in period t and x * is the policy implemented on issue s * 1 and y * is the policy implemented on issue s * 2 . In what follows, we prove the proposition by contradiction. 
, which is strictly greater than 0 for i ∈ {D, R} since s is more pressing than s for both parties. It follows that the outcome (s, s , x * , y * ) Pareto dominates (s , s, x * , y * ), a contradiction. If s * 2 = s, then the outcome (s, s * 2 , x * , y * ) Pareto dominates (s , s * 2 , x * , y * ) since
Next consider the case in which s * 1 = s and s *
. It follows that the outcome (s * 1 , s, x * , y * ) Pareto dominates (s * 1 , s , x * , y * ), a contradiction. Hence, in any dynamically Pareto efficient outcome, if issue s is addressed, issue s is addressed in period 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We show that if the incumbent's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing issue s 1 instead of addressing issue s 1 , then its period-2 payoff is also higher if issue s 1 was addressed than if issue s 1 was addressed in period 1. Proposition 2 follows from this result.
Let i denote the incumbent in both periods and let a π i (s) be the policy that can be implemented by party i that maximizes its static payoff if it addresses issue s in power state π. Note that a π i (s) does not depend on the time period. Since party i's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing issue s 1 than by addressing issue s 1 , we have v i (a π 1 i (s 1 )) + v i (s 1 ) ≥ v i (a π 1 i (s 1 )) + v i (s 1 ). Suppose if issue s 1 was addressed in period 1, then the optimal issue to address in period 2 is issue s 2 . Consider the following cases. (i) Suppose s 2 = s 1 . In this case, if issue s 1 was addressed in period 1, then the optimal issue to address in period 2 is either issue s 2 or issue s 1 . If it is issue s 2 , it follows immediately that party i's period-2 payoff is higher if issue s 1 instead of s 1 was addressed in period 1. If it is issue s 1 , since party i's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing s 1 instead of s 1 , its period-2 payoff is also higher when s 1 is addressed in period 1 and s 1 is addressed in period 2 than when s 1 is addressed in period 1 and s 1 is addressed in period 2. (ii) Suppose s 2 = s 1 . In this case, party i's period-2 payoff if issue s 1 was addressed in period 1 and issue s 1 is addressed in period 2 is the same as its period-2 payoff if issue s 1 was addressed in period 1 and issue s 2 = s 1 is addressed in period 2. Since party i achieves the highest period-2 payoff by addressing issue s 2 if issue s 1 was addressed in period 1, it follows that party i's period-2 payoff is higher if issue s 1 was addressed than if issue s 1 was addressed in period 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
To show part 1, note that when the incumbent is in strong power, it can move the policy on any issue to its ideal. Since the most pressing issue for party i gives it the lowest status quo payoff, it follows immediately that in period 2, party i achieves the highest payoff by addressing the most pressing pressing issue for itself and moving the policy on that issue to its ideal.
To show part 2, suppose party D is in weak power in period 2. Note that if party D addresses a Republican issue, it moves the policy on that issue to its ideal D, and if party D addresses a Democratic issue s, it moves the policy on that issue to r(s). Letŝ be the issue that party D addresses. Ifŝ is a Republican issue, then the difference in party D's period-2 payoff 
Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, suppose the incumbent in period 1 is D.
In what follows, we show that addressing R 2 gives party D a higher payoff than addressing R i in period 1. If party D addresses either R 2 or R i , it moves the policy on that issue to its ideal D. Hence, the gain in payoff in period 1 to party D from addressing R 2 instead of R i in period
Note also that if either R 2 or R i is addressed in period 1, then both R 1 and D 1 are rolled over to period 2, and by Proposition 3, either party's choice in period 2 is not affected. Hence, it is strictly better for party D to address R 2 instead of R i in period 1.
A similar argument shows that it is strictly better for party D to address D 2 than any D i with i ≥ 3 or any controversial issue.
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose party D is the incumbent in period 1, i.e., π 1 ∈ {S D , W D }. We prove the result by showing that addressing R 1 in period 1 results in a higher payoff in both periods for party D than addressing R 2 . For any π 1 ∈ {S D , W D }, if party D addresses R 1 or R 2 , it moves the policy to its ideal D on that issue. Hence, the difference in period-1 payoff to party D between addressing R 1 and addressing R 2 is v D (R 2 ) − v D (R 1 ) > 0. We next show that party D's period-2 payoff is also higher if it addresses issue R 1 instead of R 2 in the first period for any π 2 ∈ {S D , W D , S R , W R }.
Since party D's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing R 1 instead of R 2 for any π 1 ∈ {S D , W D }, by the argument in Proposition 2, party D's period-2 payoff is also higher if R 1 instead of R 2 was addressed in the first period if π 2 = S D or if π 2 = W D . So it suffices to consider what happens if π 2 = S R or if π 2 = W R .
In this case, if either R 1 or R 2 was addressed in period 1, party R addresses the remaining Republican issue (R 2 or R 1 ) by moving the policy to R. Hence, regardless of whether R 1 or R 2 was addressed in period
In this case, party R addresses issue D 1 in period 2 regardless of whether issue R 1 or R 2 was addressed in period 1, and the difference in period-2 payoff for party D from addressing R 1 in the first period instead of
, then party R addresses the Democratic issue D 1 if issue R 2 is rolled over to period 2 but addresses the Republican issue R 1 if issue R 1 is rolled over to period 2. In this case, party D's period-2 payoff is v
and so party D's period-2 payoff is higher if R 1 instead of R 2 was addressed in period 1.
(ii) Suppose π 2 = W R . Similar to case (i), if party R addresses the remaining Republican issue or issue D 1 regardless of whether R 1 or R 2 was addressed in period 1, then party D's period-2 payoff is higher if R 1 instead of R 2 was addressed in period 1. The remaining case is
and
In this case, party D's period-2 payoff is v
In this case, the period-1 gain in payoff for party
D is better off addressing R 1 in the first period, and the conclusion follows. Suppose instead
In this case, by the single-crossing property, we have v D (R 2 ) > v D (D 1 ), and therefore D's period-2 payoff is higher if R 1 instead of R 2 was addressed in period 1.
To summarize, party D's total payoff is higher by addressing R 1 than by addressing R 2 in period 1 for any π 2 ∈ {S D , W D , S R , W R }. Hence, independent of the voting rule, party D does not address R 2 in period 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1 in equilibrium. Since party D's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing issue D 1 than issue D 2 in period 1, it must be that its expected payoff in period 2 is higher by addressing issue D 2 instead of issue D 1 in period 1. Note that if party D continues to be in power in period 2, then under either majority or unanimity rule, its strength of power remains the same. Then, by the argument in Proposition 2, if party D continues to be in power in period 2, its period-2 payoff is higher if it addresses issue D 1 instead of D 2 in period 1. Hence, if party R comes in power in period 2, party D's period-2 payoff must be higher if it addresses issue D 2 instead of issue D 1 in period 1. 
, it follows that regardless of whether D 1 or D 2 was addressed in period 1, party R addresses issue R 1 in period 2. By Lemma 2, party D does not address issue D 2 in period 1.
Under partisan preferences, v D (D 1 ) < v D (R 1 ), implying that party D's period-1 payoff is strictly higher by addressing issue D 1 instead of issue R 1 . If party D is in power in period 2, then its period-2 payoff is higher if it addresses issue D 1 instead of issue R 1 in period 1 by the argument in Propostion 2. We next show that party D's period-2 payoff is weakly higher if it addresses issue D 1 instead of R 1 in period 1 when party R is in power in period 2. If party D
If party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1, then we have either (a) party R addresses issue D 1 in period 2, which happens if v R (D 1 ) ≤ v R (R 2 ), or (b) party R addresses issue R 2 in period 2, which happens if v R (R 2 ) < v R (D 1 ). We consider the two cases below.
(a) If party R addresses D 1 in period 2, then party D's period-2 payoff is
In this case, party D's period-2 payoff if it addresses D 1 and if it addresses R 1 in period 1 are the same.
In this case, the difference between party D's period-2 payoff if it addresses D 1 and if it addresses
In both cases, party D's period-2 payoff is weakly higher if it addresses issue D 1 instead of R 1 in period 1. Hence, party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
We first prove part (i). We establish the result under the assumption that party R comes in power in period 2 with probability 1 and
When R come in power in period 2, then it addresses R 1 if D 1 was addressed in period 1 and it addresses D 1 if D 2 or R 1 was addressed in period 1.
If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then its payoff in period 1 is
If party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, then its payoff in period 1 is
If party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1, then its payoff in period 1 is
It follows that party D prefers addressing D 2 to addressing D 1 and R 1 in the first period if
To sum up, if conditions (3), (4), and (5) are satisfied, then party D addresses D 2 in period 1.
Since these conditions can be satisfied under partisan preferences, party D may address D 2 in period 1 in equilibrium. Under strongly partisan preferences, however, party R addresses issue R 1 regardless of whether D 1 or D 2 was addressed in period 1. Then, by Lemma 2, party D does not address issue D 2 in period 1 in equilibrium under strongly partisan preferences.
We now prove part (ii). We establish the result under the assumption that party R comes in power in period 2 with probability 1 and v R (R 2 ) + v R (R) < v R (D 1 ) + v R (d(R 2 )).
When R come in power in period 2, then it addresses R 1 by moving it to d(R 1 ) if D 1 was addressed in period 1 and it addresses D 1 if R 1 was addressed in period 1.
If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then its period-1 payoff is v D (R 1 ) + v D (R 2 ) + v D (D 2 ) + v D (r(D 1 )) and its period-2 payoff is v D (d(R 1 )) + v D (R 2 ) + v D (D 2 ) + v D (r(D 1 )).
If party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1, then its period-1 payoff is v
Hence, the difference between party D's dynamic payoff if it addresses issue D 1 and if it
which is still possible under strongly partisan preferences, party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1 in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7
We prove part (i) by considering the cases when π 1 = S D and when π 1 = W D . (a) Suppose π 1 = S D . Then party D's period-1 payoff is higher by addressing issue D 1 instead of addressing issue D 2 . If π 2 = S D , then, by the argument in Proposition 2, its period-2 payoff is also higher if it addresses D 1 than if it addresses D 2 in period 1. If π 2 = S R , then, since preferences are partisan, party R addresses issue R 1 regardless of whether D 1 or D 2 was addressed in period 1. In this case, party D's period-2 payoff is again higher if it addresses D 1 than if it addresses D 2 in period 1. Since party D's dynamic payoff is higher by addressing issue D 1 than issue D 2 in period 1 when the incumbent in period 2 will be in strong power, continuity of the expected payoff in power transition probabilities implies that if it is sufficiently likely that the incumbent will be in strong power in period 2, then party D does not give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue D 2 in period 1. (b) Suppose π 1 = W D . Then party D's period-1 payoff is again higher by addressing issue D 1 instead of addressing issue D 2 . As shown in part (a), if π 2 = S R , then party D's period-2 payoff is higher if it addresses D 1 than if it addresses D 2 in period 1. So we only need to consider the case when π 2 = S D . If party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, then it will address issue D 1 in period 2 when it comes in strong power. Hence, the total gain in its payoff is 2[v D (r(D 2 )) − v D (D 2 )] + v D (D) − v D (D 1 ). If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then it will address either issue D 2 or issue R 1 in period 2 when it comes in strong power. Hence, the total gain in its payoff is
it follows that party D's dynamic payoff is higher by addressing issue D 1 than issue D 2 in period 1 in this case too. Continuity implies that if it is sufficiently likely that the incumbent will be in strong power in period 2, then party D does not give priority to the less pressing Democratic issue D 2 in period 1.
We prove part (ii) also by considering the cases when π 1 = W D and when π 1 = S D . (a)
Suppose π 1 = W D . As shown in Proposition 6, party D may give priority to issue D 2 when the incumbent in period 2 will be in weak power. By continuity, party D may give priority to issue D 2 when it is sufficiently likely that the incumbent in period 2 will be in weak power. (b)
Suppose π 1 = S D . First, consider the case when π 2 = W R . Suppose (3) holds, which implies that party R addresses R 1 if D 1 was addressed in period 1 and addresses D 1 if D 2 or R 1 was addressed in period 1. If party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, then its total gain in payoff
. If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then its total gain in payoff is 2
. If party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1, then party R will address issue D 1 in period 2 and party D's total gain in payoff
. It follows that party D prefers to address D 2 instead
Then party D addresses a Democratic issue in period 2. If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then it will address issue D 2 in period 2 and its total gain in payoff is 2[v D (D) − v D (D 1 )] + v D (r(D 2 )) − v D (D 2 ). If party D addresses issue D 2 in period 1, then it will address issue D 1 in period 2 and its total gain in payoff is 2[v D (D) − v D (D 2 )] + v D (r(D 1 )) − v D (D 1 ). If party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1, then it will address issue D 1 in period 2 and its total gain in payoff is 2[v D (D) − v D (R 1 )] + v D (r(D 1 )) − v D (D 1 ). Given (7), party D prefers to address issue
then party D prefers to address issue D 2 instead of issue D 1 in period 1. To summarize, if
(3), (6), (7), (8), and v D (D 2 ) < v D (R 1 ) hold, then party D gives priority to issue D 2 if the incumbent is in weak power in period 2. By continuity, the result holds if it is sufficiently likely that the incumbent is in weak power in period 2.
Proof of Proposition 8
If party D addresses issue D 1 in period 1, then, since π 1 = W D , party D moves the policy on issue D 1 to r(D 1 ). Suppose v D (R 1 ) > v D (D 2 ), which implies that party D addresses D 2 in period 2 since π 2 = S D . In this case, party D's total gain in payoff is 2[v D (r(D 1 )) − v D (D 1 )] + v D (D) − v D (D 2 ).
If party D addresses issue R 1 in period 1, then party D moves the policy on issue R 1 to D.
Since preferences are strongly partisan and π 2 = S D , party D addresses issue D 1 in period 2.
In this case, party D's total gain in payoff is 2
then party D's payoff is higher by addressing issue R 1 instead of addressing issue D 1 or D 2 in period 1. Under strongly partisan preferences, (v D (D) − v D (R 1 )) − (v D (r(D 1 )) − v D (D 1 )) < 0, but since v D (D 1 ) − v D (D 2 ) < 0, condition 9 can still be satisfied. It is also straightforward to show that party D does not give priority to issue D 2 . Hence, party D may address issue R 1 in
